In a world where technological and scientific progress is advancing rapidly, the cause of animal rights continues to lag behind. While animals are recognized as “living beings endowed with sensitivity” by Article 515-14 of the Civil Code, their legal status remains vague and limited. Behind this recognition, the result of many years of discussions, lies a protection deemed insufficient and unequal. Despite the efforts of animal rights defenders, many believe that the legislation does not fully address current challenges. Isn’t it essential, now more than ever, to protect species that cannot defend themselves legally?
From the Grammont Law to the reform of the Civil Code: the rise of animal rights in France
Since the “animal-machine” theory developed by philosopher Descartes, animals have long been considered mere objects. From the Grammont Law of 1850 to the recognition of their sensitivity in 2015, animals have seen their status evolve with legislative reforms. Despite these advances, challenges persist in ensuring their full protection.
The Grammont Law: a first step in animal protection
In 1850, animal protection took a decisive step with the adoption of the Grammont Law. This unprecedented text at the time introduced sanctions for cruelty to domestic animals. A fine or even a five-day prison sentence could be imposed on offenders. However, this law had two strict conditions for its application.
Firstly, the cruelty had to be committed publicly, meaning in the presence of an unspecified audience, in public places like the street or the square. Acts of violence committed in private were thus exempt from the law. The goal was not only to punish animal suffering but also the scandal provoked by these acts in front of passers-by.
Secondly, the cruelty had to be deemed abusive, a vague concept that allowed for subjective interpretation. At what point did an act of violence become abusive? The law did not specify this question, leaving the assessment to the judges.
It should also be noted that this law only protected domestic animals, those living in contact with humans for work or companionship, such as horses, oxen, or cats. The Environmental Code defines in Article R411: “Non-domestic animal species are those that have not undergone modification through human selection.” Wild animals, such as wolves, bulls, or wild boars, were excluded from this protection. Lastly, the law introduced some exceptions, such as local traditions.
The 1959 Decree: toward more inclusive protection
The Grammont Law was repealed in favor of the decree of September 7, 1959, signed by the Minister of Justice, expanding the scope of animal protection. This text marked a significant evolution by removing the requirement for public cruelty. From then on, it was no longer the reaction of passers-by to a violent scene that was considered, but the animal’s sensitivity. This change marked a break from the “humanitarian” approach to animal protection, focused on human emotions, in favor of a truly “animal-centered” approach that recognized the intrinsic interests of the animal.
However, this progress raises an essential question: how can cruelty to an animal in a private setting be proven? While the burden of proof remains essential, the means to document these abuses remain unclear and limited.
The decree also extended protection to new categories of animals. Tame animals, such as wild species captured and accustomed to living with humans, are now covered. Animals in captivity, whether in enclosures, zoos, or reserves, also benefit from this protection. Finally, the decree introduced a concrete measure: the transfer of the abused animal to an animal protection organization, providing an immediate solution for these victims of violence.
Local traditions: an exception to animal cruelty offenses
With the law of November 12, 1963, the legislator fully recognized the offense of acts of cruelty, defining any voluntary act aimed at causing unnecessary suffering or death to an animal. This offense is punishable by severe criminal penalties, including up to 2 years in prison. However, local traditions involving violence, such as bullfighting, still escape this condemnation, due to the principle of “uninterrupted local tradition.”
Animals finally recognized as sensitive, but confined to the Rural Code
The law of July 10, 1976 marked a decisive turning point in the recognition of animals in France, by attributing to them the status of sensitive beings in the Rural Code. Article 9 of the Rural Code stipulates that any animal, being a sensitive being, must be placed by its owner in conditions compatible with the biological imperatives of its species.
However, this progress remains confined to the Rural Code, which mainly governs the relationship between humans and animals in agricultural, breeding, or exploitation contexts. Therefore, this recognition of animal sensitivity is not extended to all human-animal relationships.
Violence and abandonment: crimes now punishable
The reform of the Penal Code allowed for the removal of offenses against animals from the category of crimes against property, marking an important distinction between animals and objects. Thus, offenses against animals now fall within the Fifth Book of the Penal Code, entitled “Other Crimes and Offenses.”
Article R. 655-1 of the Penal Code specifies that “the voluntary killing of a domestic, tame, or captive animal without necessity” is punishable by a fine of 1,500 euros. This provision condemns what could be called “voluntary animalicide”, in cases where the killing is not justified by legal reasons such as self-defense or necessity. However, there remains room for interpretation by the judge. For example, can the abandonment of an animal in conditions of suffering, such as in a garage without food or water, be considered voluntary killing?
Another major step forward is the explicit recognition of abandonment as a criminal offense, a first in French law. “The abandonment of a domestic, tame, or captive animal, with the exception of animals intended for repopulation, is also punishable by the same penalties.”
Recognition of animal sensitivity in the Civil Code
Since the Rural Code change with the law of July 10, 1976, the Civil Code needed to change as well. That’s why in 2015, the article 515-14 of the Civil Code was introduced : “Animals are living beings endowed with sensitivity. Under the law that protects them, animals belong to the regime of property.”
This evolution marks a significant step: animals are no longer considered mere property, although they remain “objects of law” and can be owned or used. However, their sensitivity distinguishes them from inanimate objects. It is important to note that this reform has not radically changed their legal status.
The ownership of animals: a paradox at the heart of animal Law
As animals are still classified as “property” in the Civil Code, they can therefore be traded, like material objects. This ownership is based on three fundamental attributes: usus (the right of use), fructus (the right to derive profit), and abusus (the right to dispose of them, including by sale or transfer).
This contradiction creates paradoxical situations. For example, an owner can legally rent their dog to neighbors to temporarily ensure their security, just as one would rent a car. But, unlike an object, the owner cannot dispose of the dog at the end of its life by taking it to the dump. This contradiction is explained by an essential clause: animals remain subject to the regime of property “subject to laws that protect them.”
These laws represent a limit to property rights and reflect a deep tension in animal law. On one hand, animals are recognized as sensitive beings capable of suffering, anxiety, and distress, with intrinsic value that goes beyond their mere utility. On the other hand, they continue to be treated as resources, objects for various uses according to human needs. This dual recognition, between respecting their sensitivity and treating them as property, questions the ethical and legal balance of their status.
Imagining a legal category for animal as sensitive beings
Would the animal, in the end, not be neither person nor thing, but a seperate entity and therefore unclassifiable? This would imply modifying a significant part of French law, where animals are currently integrated. This large-scale undertaking presents complex technical challenges and would also face opposition from powerful lobbying groups in hunting, breeding, and bullfighting.
Although no major changes have been made in this area in French law, it is important to recall the example of countries that have already taken bold steps in favor of non-human rights. Ecuador, for instance, did not hesitate to include in its 2008 Constitution the possibility of legal action in the name of nature and its elements. Any citizen can thus sue anyone who harms an animal species. Article 71 of the Ecuadorian Constitution states: “Nature […] has the right to the integral respect of its existence, the maintenance and regeneration of its vital cycles […].”
In Argentina, the justice system recognized in 2014 that an orangutan is a subject of law. The animal was granted the fundamental right to freedom and was given the status of “non-human person.” These examples illustrate that a non-human being can be legally recognized as a person, paving the way for the construction of true animal law.
France, which was a pioneer in recognizing animals as living beings endowed with sensitivity in 2015, is slow to explore this path. Yet, our law already recognizes legal personality for companies or associations. Why not for animals?
